

LIMATURAE

1. Cic. *Leg.* II. 39. – 2. Two Megarian paradoxes in Cicero and Horace (Cic. *Ac. Pr.* II. 49 and 92, Hor. *Ep.* II. 1. 47). – 3. ‘To swear or break altars’, Hor. *Ep.* II. 1. 16, Propertius, III. 20. 25. – 4. Self-quotation or self-repetition in Juvenal. – 5. Juv. 8. 78. – 6. Juv. 10. 356. – 7. Juv. 10. 359. – 8. Isidore *Et.* VI. 8. 3, and Servius on Virg. *A.* VI. 160.

1. Cic. *Leg.* II. 39.

A prudent assessment of the many small lacunae in the parent codex of the two Vossiani A and B, and also probably of the Heinsianus H, may still promote work on the text of the *De Legibus*. A famous passage in the second book compares the *seueritas incunda* of musical harmonies in the dramas by Livius Andronicus and Naevius¹⁾ with the exciting effect of later works on modern audiences. The beginning of the sentence is corrupt and should be so marked; the addition of *uideo* or *uidemus* after *illud quidem* does not suffice. The grammatical subjects in the two parallel clauses that follow now stand as *quae* and *eadem*, thus: *quae solebant quondam compleri seueritate incunda Liuianis et Naevianis modis, nunc ut eadem exultent²⁾, ceruices oculosque pariter cum modorum flexionibus torqueant*. Whatever else is or is not amiss³⁾, *quae* can scarcely carry the weight of the descriptive clause, and *eadem* certainly cannot. A word for ‘spectators’ is required, as some earlier critics felt, *sedilia* or *theatra*, and, in view of *exultent* etc., the latter rather than the former. One may compare, as again has been done before, Cic. *T. D.* I. 106 *pressis et flebilibus modis qui totis theatris maestitiam inferant*, *De Or.* III. 196 *theatra tota reclamant*, Quint. *I. O.* I. 6, 45 cf. the sing. at *T. D.* II. 64, Quint. *I. O.* VI. 1. 52. *commouendum theatrum*, et al. The place for ⟨*theatra*⟩ is uncertain; no palaeographical probability can be claimed for an addition after *quae* or, less likely, after *compleri*. For the sequence of the clauses many Ciceronian examples may be adduced, such as *Fin.* I. 68 *quosque labores ... eosdem, quae ... eadem*,

1) This passage provides a valuable standard of comparison for Horace’s similar complaints – *Horace on Poetry: The ‘Ars Poetica’* (1971), 263 (*A. P.* 202 n.).

2) Thus the dett. for *tute adem exultet* in ABH.

3) Critics have been disturbed by the twofold ablative in the *quae* clause – wrongly, I think; see A. du Mesnil’s note (ed. 1879).

IV. 62 *quas res ... eas ... eisdemque de rebus...*, *N. D.* II. 2 *qua eloquentia falsos deos sustulit, eadem ueros inducat.*

The structure of the two clauses as a whole is set, and shielded, by the antithesis *quondam ... nunc*. Nevertheless an area of uncertainty remains, since the *ut* preceding *eadem exultent* is merely a restitution from the corrupt *tute adem exultet* of the paradosis. This difficulty is not remedied either by the assumption of a lacuna after *exultent*⁴), or by a rewriting of the whole sentence⁵).

2. Two Megarian paradoxes in Cicero and Horace (*Cic. Ac. Pr.* II. 49 and 92, *Hor. Ep.* II. 1. 47).

Logical theory has recently helped to direct attention to Megarian-Stoic logic as something different in aim from Aristotle's, though not independent of it⁶). The Megarian paradoxes, taken up and developed by the Stoics and Sceptics, were by tradition seven in number, and these seven were specifically attributed to Eubulides, the fourth-century Megarian philosopher⁷). 'It is incredible', say W. and M. Kneale⁸), 'that Eubulides produced them in an entirely pointless way, as the tradition suggests. He must surely have been trying to illustrate some theses of Megarian philosophy'. One may find this a reasonable assumption, and yet not underestimate the difficulty of saying precisely what these theses were⁹). Thus the similarity of argument which closely associated some of these paradoxes with each other, and consequently reduces their number, may well be connected with their philosophical function.

Professor and Mrs. Kneale reduce the seven paradoxes to four. Both the *Bald Man* and the *Heap*, *φαλακρός* and *σωρίτης*, illustrate the peculiar difficulty in quantifying the parts of aggregates, such as 'hair' and 'heap'. Argumentative concreteness, but hardly the logical case, is furthered if a distinction is made between the number of hairs needed to qualify for the absence of baldness (*φαλακρός*), and the number of grains needed for a heap to cease being a heap (*σωρός*, hence *σωρίτης*).

4) K. Halm and K. Ziegler.

5) G. de Plinval in the Budé text, 1959.

6) B. Mates, 'Stoic Logic' (Univ. of Calif. Publ. in Philos. 26) 1953, I. M. Bochenski, 'Formale Logik' (*Orbis Academicus*), 2nd ed., 1962 (1st ed. 1956), 121-66, W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (1962), 112-76.

7) Diog. L. II. 108.

8) W. and M. Kneale, *op. cit.* 114-15.

9) For example K. von Fritz, *R-E Supp.* V (1932), 710ff.

How far, it may be asked, does ancient evidence reflect this reduction? It is true that our sources concerning Eubulides do not reflect it. Others however do. Hence it is worth noting references, apart from the few specifically purporting to quote Eubulides and giving no context. Thus, for example, the *Bald Man* and the *Heap*, either singly or together, are used to specify more general dialectical problems.

The sketch of Stoic doctrine at Diog. Laert. VII. 82 (after the lacuna noted by 16th century scholars) explains the *Sorites* in the very general numerical terms of 'more or less', *οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν δύο ὀλίγα ἔστιν κτλ.* With this procedure the scholium to Pers. *Sat.* 6. 80 may be compared: *Chrysippus philosophus syllogismum σωφίτην vocavit quem per adiectionem et detractionem ex acerui frumentarii similitudine ostendit.*

Cicero, *Ac. Pr.* II. 92, says, *nec hoc in aceruo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re minutatim interrogati, diues pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca, magna parua, longa breuia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto, certum respondeamus non habemus.* The same generality is found earlier in the same book at paragraph 49 *cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur.* But there, in accordance with the interlocutor's purpose, Cicero warns against using the argument – *quod genus minime in philosophia probari solet.* The two references to the *sorites* are not unrelated, and it is misleading to single out one of them in illustrating Cicero's judgement of this procedure. That however is done by R. Heinze in his comments on Hor. *Ep.* II. 1. 47.

Indeed, not only do other Ciceronian references to the *sorites* show the same generality, but the Horatian passage of the letter to Augustus, 43–9, may be brought into consideration. In Horace we are not dealing with philosophical argument, but with a clear-headed and satirical use of dialectical procedures. It is the more interesting therefore to find a procedure resembling the *Bald Man* – perhaps reflecting part of an anecdote elsewhere attributed often to Sertorius – invoked 'on the principle of the *Falling Heap*', *ratione ruentis acerui* (47). This reduces the two paradoxes to one.

It may be objected that all these generalizations and reductions derive from the Stoic or Sceptic modes of argument, and that these later modes differed from the Megarian in precisely those features. This objection cannot be disproved but is unlikely to be valid. For, whatever the connexion with 'Megarian doctrines' might have been, it is more likely than not that at any

rate the fundamental dialectical reductions which appear in such later sources as have been mentioned belong to the Megarian school. In particular there is a case for considering the paradoxes of Eubulides as exemplifying partly dialectical problems, and partly problems of mathematical logic. Thus the *Bald Man* and the *Heap* may be two instances illustrating by paradoxical conclusions the same problem of a 'continuum'¹⁰).

3. 'To swear or break altars', Horace, *Epistles* II. 1. 16,
Propertius, III. 20. 25.

iurandasque tuum per numen ponimus aras; such is Horace's address to Augustus in the Epistle above mentioned. 'Altars at which we are to swear by your godhead', or something like it, is the standard rendering, which can claim the authority of Lambinus. So can the standard example from Cic. *Pro Flacco* 90 *si aram tenens iuraret*, although it illustrates merely the ritual, and not Horace's wording. How an oath at an altar can be expressed by 'swearing an altar', *iurare aram*, remains obscure. E. Fraenkel disclaimed an understanding of the grammar of this verse¹¹); but I doubt if the difficulty is in the main grammatical. The notion, prosaically simplified, must be that the object of *iurare* is 'oath', *ius* (*iurandum*). But Horace's wording is neither prosaic nor simple, if (in formalistic language) he is using *aras* metonymically for oaths sworn at altars.

Two more passages have come to my notice which, I believe, cannot be explained without the assumption of the same metonymy. One may be a highly skilled imitation of part of Horace's phrasing; at *Sat.* 3. 144-6 Juvenal says, *iures licet et Samo thracum | et nostrorum aras, contemnere fulmina pauper | creditur*. The other, Propertius, III. 20. 25, reads, *qui pactas in foedera ruperit aras*. Here again the verb, *ruperit*, signifies that it is not the altar but the *foedus* solemnized at the altar that is broken. Yet it is the altar which is the object violated, or 'broken', by the breach of the compact, just as for Horace the altar is the object solemnized through *iurare per numen*. Virgil, at *Aeneid* XII. 496, is linguistically less venturesome than Propertius but the notion attached to the participle *testatus* is the same: *multa Iouem et laesi testatus foederis aras*.

10) Bochenski, *op. cit.* 150, suggests that 'Einige der Trugschlüsse führen auf das Problem des Kontinuums zurück und gehören zur Mathematik im engeren Sinne des Wortes'.

11) *Horace*, 386 n. 2.

Propertian scholars have here shown more insight than Horatian. D. R. Shackleton Bailey calls Propertius' *aras* a natural metonym for *foedera*, which, he rightly says, also explains *pactas* – a nuance *tactas* (ς) would remove¹²). W. A. Camps regards the expression as welding together in a unique way such established notions as *pangere foedus*, *rumpere foedus*, and *ius iurandum*¹³). Commentators of Horace, on the other hand, seem to have made do with Kiessling's remark that when the altar is touched by a person swearing an oath, *ara*, as it were, participates in the action, and thus becomes a kind of grammatical object¹⁴) –, which strikes me as right as far as it goes.

In the otherwise competent article on *iurare* in the Latin *Thesaurus*, the compiler places the Horatian and Juvenalian instances of *iurare aras* in a section entitled '*indicatur per quem vel per quid iuretur*'¹⁵). Here prepositional usages (*per Iouem* etc.)¹⁶) are followed by others merely containing the accusative (*Iouem lapidem* etc.)¹⁷). Yet *aras* makes an odd companion to *Iouem*, *numen*, and the rest, even though such grammatical objects as *maria*, *terram*, *undas* seem to form a link between (*iurare*) *numen* and (*iurare*) *aras*. If *aras* is a 'natural metonym' for *foedera*, then the instances of (*iurare*) *aras* belong primarily to the section entitled '*indicatur quid iuretur*', and should be placed in the vicinity of *foedera*, *fidem*, etc. on the one hand, and of *ius iurandum* etc. on the other¹⁸).

A problem clarified often raises another. Did Propertius and Horace have precedents in earlier usage for *rumpere* and *iurare aras*? In the case of the former, 'the obscurity of this phrase' indeed 'has the Propertian stamp' (Shackleton Bailey); in the case of the latter, the apparent clarity that conceals com-

12) *Propertiana*, 207. His remarks on *in foedera* and *ruperit* should also be noted.

13) Propertius, Book III (1966) *ad* l. While these phrases may, as he says, be used in prose, I should be surprised to find, as he suggests, *iurare aras* so used.

14) *Horaz. Briefe* (1889 and later; so also in Heinze's commentary) '... wenn der Schwörende einen Altar berührt, und dadurch dieser an der Handlung gleichsam als betroffenes Objekt beteiligt wird'. That the touching of the sacred altar is a very old and important feature cannot be doubted: Cic. *Pro Flacco* 90, above p. 31; cf. F. Marx on Pl. *Rud.* 1332 citing Herod. VI. 91, Plut. *Solon* 12. But custom and belief are insufficient to explain the wording of the Roman poets.

15) Tessmer, *TLL*, VII. 2, 674. 83 ff.

16) *Ibid.* 674. 84 ff.

17) *Ibid.* 675. 53 ff.

18) *Ibid.* 671. 81 ff., 672. 9 ff.

plexity is very Horatian. Nevertheless the linguistic frame of reference that would enable a Latin poet of the first century B. C. to connect *iurare* and *aras* can scarcely have originated in that century. One may therefore ask the question whether *iurare aras* was not an archaic locution, known still in the first century, and suggesting a meaning for *iurare* long since superseded, something like 'solemnize, ritualize'. Such a notion would explain the odd combination *ius iurandum*¹⁹). Regrettably the derivation of neither *iurare* nor *ius* is certain. If these words are rightly connected with Indo-European words meaning 'ritual solemnization', *iurare aras* like *ius iurandum* would find an explanation in archaic religion²⁰). *ius iurare* would mean 'solemnize a ritual formula', *iurare aras* 'solemnize, i. e. speak ritually at, altars', and *rumpere pactas aras* 'violate altars so solemnized, i. e. at which pacts have been made', or 'break pacts made at altars'. Such are the questions raised by later usage. They may be raised, but cannot be answered with any certainty.

4. Self-quotation or self-repetition in Juvenal.

The terms are clumsy but useful. Self-quotation is a hazardous notion. It implies deliberate repetition, but such deliberation may not have been present on all or many occasions. Self-repetition, on the other hand, is rife in Latin poetry, notably in Catullus, Lucretius, Virgil. It may but need not imply delibera-

19) The accusative of things 'solemnized' or sworn is shown by the Thesaurus (VII. 2, 671. 58ff.) to be the rule from archaic Latin onward. The accusative of deities to whom an oath is directed is not equally old as far as our evidence goes, *TLL*, VII. 2, 675. 46ff. E. Norden's view (Verg. *A.* VI², p. 226) that it was introduced from Greek *ὀμνῆσαι* + acc. in the late republican age is based on the chronology of the instances preserved; no case is extant before the Ciceronian age. Yet one wonders if Apuleius' *vetustissimus ritus*, Gellius' *sanctissimum ius iurandum*, the archetypal Roman oath *per Iouem lapidem iurare* (Fest. Paul. 115 Mueller, Apul. *De deo Soc.* 5. 4, cf. Polyb. III. 25 *διὰ λίθου*) is likely to have been rephrased by Cicero and his contemporaries (Cic. *Fam.* VII. 12. 2) as Gellius later has it (I. 21. 4) *Iouem lapidem, inquit, quod sanctissimum iusiurandum habitum est, paratus ego iurare sum*. If the accusative is old both for the things sworn and the deities concerned, the state of affairs will have been something like Virgil's use of *testatus*: above p. 31.

20) A. Walde, *Lat. etym. Wörterbuch*, 3rd ed. by J. B. Hofmann, I (1938), 733; Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. étym.*⁴ (1959), 329 'le mot (sc. *ius*) a dû signifier à l'origine "formule religieuse qui a force de loi"... *ius iurare* "prononcer la formule sacrée qui engage", d'où *iusiurandum*.' 'Néanmoins, le rapport sémantique entre *ius* et *iuro* n'est plus senti en latin...'

tion. It is however open to doubt when the repeated passage sits loosely in its context. In such cases we may be faced not with repetition but with interpolation.

In this note I discuss some repetitions or near-repetitions of whole lines in Juvenal that have tempted textual critics into applying the forcible measure of deletion. I have written elsewhere on a similar problem in the text of Horace²¹). But in Horace a strong intellectual unity is noticeable everywhere, however varied and flexible it may be, and thus provides a basis for an appeal to *sed nunc non erat his locus*²²). Juvenal has his own inimitable unity, but the sparse Augustan texture and subtle placing are not frequently a part of it. These features make it hard for the critic to find a criterion for distinguishing the genuine Juvenal from the spurious. I do not here consider whole paragraphs of one satire rephrased in another, even though it may seem to suit one context better than the other, as 8. 200-10 over against 2. 143-8²³); nor mere echoes of phrasing such as 10. 239 over against 11. 172-3²⁴).

Repetition, in Juvenal as elsewhere, of a verse previously employed need not necessarily be suspect. This is shown by the congruence of 10. 365-6 and 14. 315-16. In the latter passage, which also appears to be the later, Juvenal says, *nullum numen habes, si sit prudentia: nos te, | nos facimus, Fortuna, deam*. These effective lines cap two stories and their moral *miseram est magna custodia census* (304), and precede a further pronouncement on *mensura census* (316ff.). Effective the lines certainly are, but their relation to the stories of the worried millionaire Licinus as well as of Alexander and Diogenes in his tub is haphazard, although I would not go so far as to say that lines 315-16 are quite irrelevantly repeated from 10. 365. Even if it were true that the poem were better without them, the *sententia* breaks off before the end of the verse, and cannot be spared unless one resorts to inconclusive rewriting. In *Sat.* 10 on the other hand the *sententia* consists of two complete verses, and the tail-end of the second, *caeloque locamus*, adapts it to the context of prayer. Thus the two passages seem to be sound. And if that is so, Juvenal in *Sat.* 14 has allowed himself to repeat a good couple of verses in a diffe-

21) Horace on Poetry: *The 'Ars Poetica'*, 421 n.

22) Hor. *A. P.* 19.

23) The latter passage is strongly indicted by O. Ribbeck, *Der echte und unechte Juvenal* (1865), 104-6.

24) '*Fort. del.*', Knoche on 10. 239.

rent context where it makes a strong effect but not, it seems, a very apt one. Here, as often, textual criticism issues into literary, and to find what constitutes 'appropriateness' for Juvenal is a literary question.

There is another lesson to be learned. The apparent lack of appropriateness – in the Augustan sense of the term – cannot be claimed, mechanically, as a sufficient criterion for editorial decisions on the text of Juvenal. The data in the last passage seem to make for preservation of the same verses in two poems. This argument however need not be equally valid elsewhere. *Sat.* 13. 137 *uana supervacui dicunt chirographa ligni* continues the previous verse and is validated by the one immediately following: *arguit ipsorum quos littera* &c., the whole sentence being firmly set in the wider context as an example. At 16. 41 (in the last, incomplete, satire) the line is repeated, and adapted to the conditions there obtaining by the change of *dicunt* to *dicens*. But in this place the grammar of the sentence fails to provide the external confirmation found in the earlier instance (at 14. 316). We need to fall back on the inherent rhetorical function of this verse in this place. That function appears to be exceedingly weak, for Juvenal is not concerned in *Sat.* 16 (though he is in *Sat.* 13) with the opposing party; he is concerned only with such unjust acts as the digging up of a boundary stone or the refusal to repay a loan. What he omits in the later poem is precisely what validates the verse in the earlier – I mean 13. 138–9, the position of the opposing party. Hence there is a case for querying 16. 41, and imputing interpolation. Even here however some will doubtless claim that, after the violation of the boundaries has been described in 3 ½ lines, some detail was required to set off disagreement over the loan. If the verse, they may claim, had not occurred in an earlier poem one would perhaps note the disparate nature of 16. 41 but excuse it on other grounds.

In a third passage the repetition is least convincing. At *Sat.* 10 Juvenal caricatures the diseases that beset the old; their number is myriad. The caricature is sharpened by a catalogue of large numbers – as many as the lovers of Oppia, the patients killed by the incompetent doctor Themison, the defrauded partners of Basilus and Hirrus, &c. The catalogue is effective and eloquent; Juvenal as it were runs his finger down one long list, starting *promptius expediam* . . ., which is continued by *quot* six times over (220–4). Then is added a single comparison starting *percurram citius quot* and magnifying the number of villas owned by a *non-*

veau riche who started as a barber. This addition, far from enhancing, diminishes the vigour of the comparisons – and it is here that the repeated verse occurs which suits 1. 25 so well: *quo ton-dente granis inueni mihi barba sonabat*. Hence the two verses, 10. 225–6, are suspect, and may betray the descriptive tendencies of an interpolator rather than Juvenal's hand spoiling a strong passage by the addition of a weak finale.

In sum, then, the three groups of passages that have been discussed sound a warning note against the mechanical assumption of large-scale interpolations, but also against the mechanical denial of interpolations, in Juvenal. An effective association of ideas may prompt repetition of earlier verses, even if the context makes against their use. This is shown by the syntax of the repeated verses in the first of our instances, whereas the same grammatical protection cannot be claimed in the second, and still less in the third instance.

5. Juv. 8. 78 *stratus humo palmes uiduas desiderat ulmos*.

The conjunction of vines and elms is familiar from Roman agriculture as it is from Roman poetry, cf. Cat. 62. 54 (*uitis coniuncta ulmo marito*, Virg. *G. I. 2 ulmisque adiungere uites*, Ov. *Am. II. 16. 41 ulmus amat uitem, uitis non deserit ulmum*, et al.

The above unattached *sententia* about the vine-shoot, *palmes*, fails to bear out the warning addressed to Ponticus which it is supposed to illustrate: *miserum est aliorum incumbere famae* (76). The vine is brought in to vary the simile and grammar, but not the thought, of the intervening verse, *ne collapsa ruant subductis tecta columnis* (77); in both cases a prop is withdrawn and a collapse, or its consequence, is envisaged. Unless, therefore we have here an interpolated *sententia*, which I am loath to believe, the text is in need of revision. The least that needs to be done is to bring the *sententia*, still with the indicative *desiderat*, closer to the *ne* clause by the use of a colon or semicolon²⁵).

But more is in fact needed. This, at any rate partly, was seen by R. Beer²⁶). He therefore drew on the false reading *discinderet*, which is found in the margin of the Pithoeanus, and he conjectured *desideret*, in place of *desiderat*. Thus the verb is attached to the preceding *ne* clause²⁷) and a light punctuation is required

25) Thus N. Vianello in his Paravia edition of 1935.

26) *Spicilegium Iuuenalianum* (Lipsiae, 1885), 73.

27) As Beer says, *ibid.*, 'quo aptissime altera imago priori adnectitur,

after *columnis*. Subsequently the subjunctive was noticed in codd. FGHU – not the only place in Juvenal where G and U, often with F attached, offer a text superior to P²⁸). Housman's text offered the subjunctive and the punctuation then demanded²⁹). Standard texts of later date do not.

6. Juv. 10. 356 *orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano*.

Is one of Juvenal's most familiar sayings the work of a forger? Mr. M. D. Reeve, in *CR* (1970), 135–6, attempted to show that it is. Style and content seem to him equally unworthy of Juvenal. My note is to show that he fails on both counts. But, as is sometimes the case, the radical textual proposal has served to draw attention to inadequacies of our understanding, though not perhaps for the reasons the textual critic has alleged.

Stylistically, the change from *orandum est* (356) to *posce* (357) is said to break the syntax in such a way that 357 reads like a repetition of the preceding verse. But when 357 is made to follow 355 the syntax is said to run on from 354 to 362, and *posce* (357) nicely picks up *poscas* (354), cf. 11. 148 *cum posces, posce Latine*.

Not surprisingly, Juvenal allows himself an occasional series of imperatives³⁰) or of imperative and personal subjunctive, as in the passage above. But more often a sharp variation, formal and rhetorical, highlights the satirist's poetic intention. Thus the imperatives and third person subjunctives with the attendant change of grammatical subject³¹).

A similar practice may be observed when a gerundive or gerund intervenes, although these are not grammatical forms that occur frequently. Remembering the different nuances of gerundive and imperative, such as 3. 197 *uiuendum est* and 228 *uine*, I note, after the imperatives cited in n. 31 from *Sat.* 14, sub-

cum imagines illae arte cohaerentes distrahantur indicativo, pendeat etiam tota sententia altera?

28) Cf. Housman's preface, pp. xxii ff.

29) So did J. D. Duff's 'unpretending school edition'.

30) E.g. Juv. 7. 24–7, 11. 183–4, 190–2, and especially 14. 191 *accipe*, 192 *scribe, uigila, age, perlege*, 193 *posce*, 196 *dirue*.

31) The subjunctives may be impersonal or, more frequently, personal, e.g. Juv. 4. 65 *accipe* but then *agatur* and back to 67 *propera*, 68 *consume*; 8. 21 *esto*, 22 *pone* but 23 *praecedant*; 9. 41 *numera*, 42 *numerentur*; 104 *claudite*, 105 *tegant, iunge, tollite*, 106 *fac eant, recumbat*; 13. 120 *accipe*, 124 *curentur*, 125 *committe*; 14. 60 *uerre, ostende*, 61 *descendat*, 62 *tergeat*.

junctives from 200 onwards, and then, in turn, 213 *abi*, 215 *parcendum est*, 220 *crede*. Translators tend to convey the uninterrupted jussive implication by continued imperatives – *parcendum est*, ‘be gentle’, etc.³²).

Juvenal’s style then is altogether more varied and pointed than the strictures imply. What is amiss in the sequence 10. 345–6 *nil ergo optabant homines? si consilium uis, | permittes ipsis ... numinibus* etc. 354–6 *ut tamen et poscas aliquid | ... | orandum est... | 357 ...posce* etc.? Nothing that I can see. The variation of the grammar recalls some of the passages quoted above, and only a few lines earlier we read in the same satire, at 339 *ni parere uelis, pereundum erit*, followed in the very next verse by *si scelus admittas, dabitur mora paruula*. Nor does it strike me as true that 357 *fortem posce animum mortis terrore carentem* ‘reads like a repetition’ of 356 *orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano*. Rather 357 begins a series of qualities of the healthy *animus*, some of which, like the capability to undergo great hardships, demand a *corpus sanum* as well as a *mens sana*. In fact 357–62 specify what the *mens sana in corpore sano* is supposed to achieve, so that the apparent intrusion of the impersonal *orandum est* makes a general proposition, of which the following verses are but applications. The imperative *posce* therefore aptly picks up the earlier subjunctive *ut ... poscas* after Juvenal’s moral demand, *orandum est*, has been stated in general terms.

Objections to the content of the piece strike me as equally invalid. Juvenal is said to hold that ‘the only thing worth praying for is virtue – and that lies in our own hands. Substitute ‘health’ for ‘virtue’ and he can be charged not only with the dereliction of a moralist’s duty but also with propagating palpable falsehood.’ Moreover ‘praying for health physical and mental may be a convention (see Mayor), but nothing could be further from Juvenal’s mind here than health or conventional prayers’.

Not a bit of it. To make his point Juvenal could do no better than use a conventional prayer, and then draw its sting of conventionality – by the adroit use of another convention, on which more presently. A prayer suited the satirist’s purpose because it enabled him to answer the question (55, if, as I think

32) *Sat.* 4 may be compared: 34f. *incipi, licet, non est cantandum, narrate*. Compare also the gerund at 8. 116 *uitanda est Hispania* but 117 *parce et mesoribus*, or 11. 29ff. *quaeras* and other subjunctives, 33 imperatives, 35 *nosceda est mensura sui*, or 14. 252 *quaere, eme* but 254 *medicamen habendum est*.

most likely, it is an independent question) for what kinds of things, *fas est genua incerare deorum*.

To this question – and indeed questions that arise from the prayers and wishes satirized all the way from 56 onward – Juvenal, at the end of the poem, gives more than one answer. In fact there are three, and there is a great deal of subtlety, an almost Horatian complexity, in the way in which they are played off against each other.

First, at 346–53, Juvenal advises that all decisions should be left to the gods. Humans merely want to gratify their whims; they opt for *incunda*, instead of *utile* and *aptissima*. Hence there should be no prayers, because, the theologian suggests, the gods know what is best for human kind.

Secondly, however, at 354–62, men may reasonably pray and make vows to the gods after all. The recommended prayer, at first sight, looks pretty conventional, even trite; *orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano* (356) is the impersonal and peremptory advice, almost a command. But the reader is quickly undecieved. For when it is specified what this ‘health’ amounts to, Juvenal lets another convention take over. This convention is an ideal hard to attain. Indeed one may wonder whether any mortal ever attains it, except perhaps such heroes as Hercules. Juvenal sets up the ideal of the Cynic-Stoic Wise Man, *mortis terrore carentem*, etc. (357–62).

Thirdly, in the last five lines, 362–66, of the poem, it appears that these qualities are such as man himself has, ideally, in his power to achieve. For Chance, *Fortuna*, against whom the Wise Man prevails, is but a human figment – *nullum numen habes, si sit prudentia: nos te, | nos facimus, Fortuna, deam caeloque locamus*.

This threefold sequence of thought is more complex than Juvenal’s sequences commonly are. More often something less involuted, a straightforward and hard-hitting effect, is sought. Perhaps those methods suit his genius better. But this piece shows that when he desired it he could master a more complex way of thinking.

So far then from proving an intrusion, the renowned *mens sana in corpore sano* cannot be spared without the loss of an important link in Juvenal’s satiric argument. The link is unexpected; a *nasutus interpolator* would be the last to think of it. But Juvenal did.

The background of thought in ancient philosophy – the relation of health and sanity to *uirtus* or *arete* – has not been

touched on in this note. But it is by no means irrelevant to what Juvenal has been trying to do, and I may return to it elsewhere.

7 Juv. 10. 359 *qui ferre queat quoscumque labores* but *dolores* GU.

There was a distinction between *labor* and *dolor*, not always observed in actual usage; Cicero comments on it, *T. D.* II. 35. Naturally, in Stoic systematizing, which lies behind the Juvenalian passage, the two terms are sometimes juxtaposed; thus Cic. *T. D.* IV. 51 *contemnendae res humanae sunt, negligenda mors est, patibiles et dolores et labores*; cf. *op. cit.* IV. 16, Diog. Laert. VII. 112 on ἄχθος, ἐνόχλησις, and ὀδύνη. Nevertheless the appearance of toil, instead of pain, is, to say the least, unexpected, since it follows contempt of death (357) and of length of life (358), and precedes anger as well as passionate desire or covetousness (360).

Acceptance of *labores* is not made easier when two lines below (361) *labores*, coupled with *aerumnas*, reappears in the same final place of the line. It is there applied to the hero of Cynic-Stoic endurance, the doer of great deeds, Hercules³³). These deeds are the *Herculis labores* properly so called, and *aerumnas* is another apt word for the same notion³⁴), although in different contexts it may mean 'pain, tribulation'. Hence Buecheler, and later Hosius³⁵) without arguing the case fully, were right to prefer *dolores* in the former place and *labores* in the latter.

But even if *labores* were acceptable on grounds of content at 359, that line, ending *quoscumque labores*, would still be confronted by 361, ending *saenosque labores*. The second would intolerably weaken the first, which is expressed with great generality. The triple rhyme, *labores (dolores) – potiores – labores*, is rare but acceptable; not so the repeated nouns. Repetitions of course occur in Juvenal, but I am not aware of one which has a similar enfeebling effect. The instances to which Friedlaender³⁶) and Mayor³⁷)

33) For *aerumna* in this context, see Plautus, *Ep.* 179 *sexta aerumna, Per. 2 superavit aerumnis suis aerumnas Herculi*, Cic. *Fin.* II. 118 *Herculis ... aerumnas*, Petron. 48. 7 *duodecim aerumnas Herculis, et al. TLL*, I, 1066. 54ff.

34) Cf. *TLL*, s.v., J.E.B. Mayor, Juv. 10. 361 n.

35) F. Buecheler, *RM*, xxxv (1880), 398, and C. Hosius, *App. Crit. ad Juv.* (1888), 92, *RM*, xlvi (1891), 288. Friedlaender (Juv. 10. 361 n.) refers misleadingly to Buecheler as though he had defended the repetition of *labores*. On the other hand Vianello's Paravia edition, like Leo in his app. crit., credits Buecheler with Hosius' article in *RM*.

36) Friedlaender in his edition of Juvenal, p. 56 n. 8.

37) J.E.B. Mayor on Juv. 10. 191 and 14. 48.

appeal in their discussions seem to me of a different kind. For they either duplicate the word in different cases or forms (as *amanti-amantis, luget – lugere*), or simply specify (*deformem ... uultum – deformem pro cute pellem*), or else they throw emphasis on the second word (as *breue – breuior, pulsare – etsi pulsetur*)³⁸; a number of them are textually dubious³⁹.

The GU reading *dolores* therefore should replace *labores* at the end of 359⁴⁰). The word was, it seems, introduced by parablepsy from *labores* at the same place two lines below, 361. Housman printed *dolores* but, to my knowledge, no recent editor, apart from Vianello⁴¹), has done so. Other excellent GU readings were listed by Housman⁴²), and have caused no disagreement. The present passage however has, for no reason that I can see.

8. Servius on Virg. *A.* VI. 160 and Isidore, *Et.* VI. 8. 3.

It is well known that Isidore not only laid Servius' Virgilian commentaries under contribution but that the verbal echoes are often very close. At times there is even a case for emending the text of Servius from Isidore. Thus E. Fraenkel had a point in proposing the addition of the etymology ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας after *cardo dictus* at Servius *A.* I. 449 *cardo dictus quasi cor ianuae*⁴³). For Isidore, *Et.* XV. 7 reads *cardo ... dictus ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας, quod quasi cor hominem totum, ita ille cuneus ianum regat atque moueat*.

Among the verbal echoes H. Phillip's serviceable collections⁴⁴) often show near-literal agreement. Alterations in the wording are minute, such as

38) Thus Juv. 6. 645–7, 9. 77–8, and the present instance (Friedlaender); also 6. 208–9, 504–5, 10. 191–2, 256–7; 14. 47–8, 16. 8–10, and the present instance (Mayor).

39) Thus Juv. 8. 5–7, 9. 119–21 (though claimed by (Friedlaender), and 14. 70–1 (though claimed by Mayor).

40) For the phrasing *qui perferre queat quoscumque dolores*, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 98. 14 *ut possimus dolores quocumque modo corpus inuaserint perferre*, followed as in Juvenal by an address to *Fortuna*.

41) N. Vianello, Paravia 1935 – if that edition may be described as recent.

42) Housman's edition, introduction p. xxiii.

43) E. Fraenkel, *JRS*, xxxviii (1948), 140 (= *Kl. Beitr.* etc. II [1964], 360).

44) H. Phillip, 'Die historisch-geographischen Quellen in den etymologiae des Isidorus von Sevilla', *Quellen und Forschungen zur alten Geschichte und Geographie*, xxvi (1913), 5 ff.

Isid. *Et.*

IX. 2. 41 Gangaridae populi sunt inter Assyrios Indosque, habitantes circa Gangen fluvium. unde etiam Gangaridae nuncupati sunt.

XIV. 8. 34 aprica loca, quae sole gaudent, quasi *ἀνευ φροβήης*, id est frigore; siue quod (quae *cod. Bern.*) sint aperto (-a *cod. Tol.*) caelo.

Serv.

G. III. 27 Gangaridae populi sunt inter Indos et Assyrios, habitantes circa Gangen fluvium. unde etiam Gangaridae dicti sunt.

A. V. 128 apricis sole gaudentibus. sane apricus et locus dicitur sole calens ... apricum autem quasi *ἀνευ φροβήης*, sine frigore.

Does the slight divergence between Servius' and Isidore's definitions of *sermo* belong to the same unimportant mode of variation?

Isid. *Et.*

VI. 8. 3 sermo autem dictus quia inter utrumque seritur. unde in Vergilio 'multa inter se (se uario sermone) serebant' (*A. VI. 160*).

Serv.

A. VI. 160 'multa inter sese uario sermone serebant'. hinc proprie dictus est sermo, qui inter utrumque (duos var. l.) seritur.

Hardly, since Isidore's *quia* expresses the correct causal relationship between *sermo* and *inter utrumque seritur*: speech is called *sermo* 'because' it is 'joined' between the speakers, not 'which' is joined, there being no other kinds of *sermo*, monologue (an internal dialogue) of course excepted. The descriptive relative clause has its proper place for example in the second of the passages quoted above.

Hence *quia* should appear in the Servian passage as it does in the Isidorian which is derived from it. So I have noted elsewhere⁴⁵) without going into the matter, though citing another definition of *sermo*, from which both Servius and Isidore ultimately derive: Varro, *L. L. VI. 64 sermo... a serie...; sermo enim non potest in uno homine esse solo, sed ubi <ο>ratio cum altero coniuncta.*

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45) *Horace on Poetry: The 'Ars Poetica'*, 136.